Existing communication models for multiparty computation (MPC) either assume that all messages are delivered eventually or any message can be lost. Under the former assumption, MPC protocols guaranteeing output delivery are known. However, this assumption may not hold in some network settings like the Internet where messages can be lost due to denial of service attack or heavy network congestion. On the other hand, the latter assumption may be too conservative. Known MPC protocols developed under this assumption have an undesirable feature: output delivery is not guaranteed even only one party suffers message loss.
Introduction
The study of secure multiparty computation (MPC) was initiated by Yao [26] in the 2-party setting and extended to the multiparty setting by Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson [16] . Roughly speaking, a set of n parties wants to jointly compute a function g of their (private) inputs. However, up to t of them are corrupted by an adversary. The requirements are that (i) non-corrupted parties obtain their outputs and (ii) the adversary learns nothing but the outputs of the corrupted parties.
Several communication models are considered in the current body of work, giving rise to different feasibility results, as follows.
Common global clock and message delivery within bounded time:
This is the synchronous model. Protocol execution proceeds in rounds. It is assumed that the duration of one round is sufficient for a message to be sent and delivered from one party to another.
If t < n/3, then information-theoretically secure MPC protocols exist [3, 11] in a point-to-point network. If we assume the existence of a broadcast channel, then information-theoretically secure MPC protocols exist for t < n/2 [1, 12, 22] .
If the definition of secure MPC is relaxed such that non-corrupted parties are not guaranteed to receive their outputs, then computationally secure MPC protocols exist [16, 17] for any t < n.
• Eventual message delivery: This is a weaker assumption than the previous one. Under this assumption, we can have secure MPC protocols that guarantee output delivery. However, given the current form of the Internet, this assumption may still be too strong. Messages sent to a party can be lost due to denial of service(DoS) attack [19] or heavy network congestion.
• Messages can be blocked: Under the message blocking model, known MPC protocols have an undesirable feature: output delivery cannot be guaranteed when one party suffers message loss (even if all parties are honest). An adversary can then have a simple strategy to prevent parties from receiving the outputs: carrying out a denial of service attack on a chosen party.
The assumption that every message can be lost may be conservative. Depending on the scenarios, it may be reasonable to assume a few, but not many, parties suffer from from DoS attack or network congestion at the same time.
In this work, we propose a communication model that is an intermediate between the eventual message delivery model and the message blocking model. Under this model, we construct a secure multiparty computation protocol that guarantees output delivery to all parties except those experience severe message loss.
Our model
Three assumptions are made in our model:
1. A common global clock: Given the current state of art for modern network, we believe it is reasonable to assume the existence of a common global clock 3 . Protocol execution proceeds in rounds. Every party knows when a round starts and ends.
2. Three type of parties: We assume that there are three types of parties in the network:
• Corrupted parties who are controlled by an adversary.
• Honest parties with connection problems (where message delivery is never guaranteed). An honest party that fails to contact the common global clock belongs to this category.
• Honest parties that can normally communicate but at each round they may fail to send/receive a small fraction of messages due to transient network problems.
From now on, we will address the second type of parties as constrained parties and the third type of parties as fault-free parties. A constrained party does not necessarily realize that it suffers from connection problem.
3.
A time bound related to network latency: We assume that there is a time bound ∆ such that
• Duration of a round is equal to ∆.
• Any fault-free party p can successfully communicate with all but δ fraction of fault-free parties in any round (i.e., message transmission from it to another party takes time less than ∆ and vice versa). The set of fault-free parties p can communicate with may vary each round.
Discussions of our model and related work
The first assumption is also made in the synchronous model. The second assumption is inspired by the previous work in distributed computing. Thambidurai and Park [24] , and independently Garay and Perry [14] , introduced the concept of hybrid failure model which allows a mix of different degrees of failures. Our second assumption can be viewed as assuming a mix of omission [20, 21] and Byzantine failures, which is a more general assumption than the previous ones considered in the literature.
In [6, 23, 25] , protocols for broadcast and consensus are considered in a communication model where the edges can be faulty (in addition to faulty nodes). In [9] , Canetti, Halevi and Herzberg considered the problem of maintaining authenticated communication over untrusted communication channels, where an adversary can corrupt links for transient periods of time. In both lines of work, there is a bound on the number of faulty links connected to an honest party. On the other hand, our model captures the scenario when an honest party suffers from arbitrary message loss.
We believe the third assumption is more realizable than assuming a time bound on the maximum latency, and yet it is sufficient to guarantee output delivery of fault-free parties.
If constrained parties are absent and δ = 0, then our model is reduced to the synchronous model assuming eventual message delivery. On the other hand, if fault-free parties are absent, then our model can be viewed as a message blocking model with time-out.
Our results
We define secure multiparty computation under our communication model. We defer the formal definition to the next section, but roughly speaking, we require the following: (i) the fault-free parties always receive their outputs; (ii) a constrained party either receive its output or it aborts. (iii) the adversary learns nothing but the outputs of the corrupted parties.
We consider an adaptive, rushing adversary. The adversary is adaptive in the sense that in any round, it can turn a fault-free party into a constrained party or into a corrupted party. In each round, the adversary has the power to decide the set of messages a constrained party can receive/send and the set of parties a fault-free party can communicate with (subject to the δ constraint). We assume each pair of parties is connected by a private channel.
Let e f be an upper bound on the number of corrupted parties; e c be an upper bound on the number of constrained parties; n be the total number of parties. For δ < • A broadcast protocol for n > 3e f + 2e c ; we also have a different broadcast protocol for n ≥ 3e f + 2e c if it is known that e f , e c ≥ 1.
• A VSS protocol for n > 4e f + 3e c .
Notations, Definitions and Overview

Notations
We use two special symbols φ and ⊥ in the paper. φ is a special symbol denoting the failure of receiving a valid message. During a round of protocol execution, if a party p s is supposed to send a message to another party p r but p r fails to receive a valid message, then we say p r receives φ.
To help understanding of the notion φ, for the moment, let us assume δ = 0. Then there are 3 possibles reasons for a party p r receiving p s :
1. p s is a corrupted party and p s does not send the message.
2. p s is a constrained party. p s fails to send the message.
3. p s is a fault-free party and p r is a constrained party. p s sends the message but p r fails to receive it. If δ > 0, then it is possible that both p s and p r are fault-free parties and yet p r receives φ from p s .
⊥ is a special symbol denoting abortion. In any protocol execution, if a party outputs ⊥, then the party aborts the entire execution at that point. We also assume that a constrained party outputs ⊥ if it fails to contact the common global clock. Our protocols are designed in such a way that only a constrained party will output ⊥. For clarity, when we refer to an uncorrupted party p i in our proofs, unless otherwise specified, we implicitly assume that p i is a fault-free party or a constrained party who has not aborted at that point (i.e., we do not consider a constrained party that has already aborted).
Definition of secure computation
We define the secure multiparty computation using the ideal/real paradigm. Let g be the function that the parties aim to compute. We assume the function g is defined in a way such that if the input of an party is φ, then the evaluation of g does not depend on the input of that party and the corresponding output for that party is ⊥. We also assume that if the output of a party is not equal to ⊥, then its output contains the set of parties which input φ. As a warm-up, we will start with the case of a non-adaptive adversary.
The non-adaptive case
Ideal world: In the ideal world, there is a trusted party (TP) which carries out the evaluation of the function g. The adversary in the ideal world is called the ideal world adversary. The evaluation consists of the following steps:
1. The adversary chooses a set of corrupted parties P f , modifies their inputs (which can become φ) and sends them to the trusted party; the adversary chooses three sets of constrained parties P c 1 , P c 2 and P c 3 ; 4 the trusted party receives the private inputs from parties that are not in P f ∪ P c 1 ; the trusted party receives φ as the input from the constrained parties in P c 1 .
2. Let x i be the input the trusted party received from p i . The trusted party computes (y 1 , . . . , y n ) = g(x 1 , . . . , x n ). Let P φ be the set of parties which send φ to the trusted party.
3. The adversary receives the outputs of the parties in P f ; parties in P c 1 ∪ P c 2 receive ⊥; other parties receive their outputs (note that the outputs contain the set P φ ).
4. The adversary generates an output based on the information it gathered.
Real world: In the real world, parties execute a protocol Π to evaluate g. The adversary in the real world is called the real world adversary. Before the execution of Π, the adversary chooses three sets of constrained parties P c 1 , P c 2 and P c 3 ; and a set of constrained parties. Corrupted parties may deviate from the protocol in an arbitrary manner. Messages delivery are controlled by the adversary, subject to the constraints of our communication model. At the end of the protocol execution, the fault-free parties and the constrained parties output their outputs from Π; the real-world adversary generates an output (which can depend on the information it gathers during the execution of Π).
We say a protocol Π is a secure multiparty computation protocol if the following holds: for every real world adversary A, there exists an ideal world adversary I such that:
4 Although a constrained party in P c 3 is not distinguishable from a fault-free party in the ideal world, the set P is defined due to a subtle technical point.
1.
A and I choose the same three set of constrained parties and the same set of corrupted parties.
2. The following two distributions are indistinguishable:
• The output of I and the outputs of fault-free parties and constrained parties in the ideal world.
• The output of A and the outputs of fault-free parties and constrained parties in the real world.
The adaptive case
Ideal world:
1. The adversary chooses a set of corrupted parties P f 1 (in an adaptive manner), modifies their inputs (which can become φ) and sends them to the trusted party; the adversary chooses a set of constrained parties P c 1 ; the trusted party receives the private inputs from parties that are not in P f 1 ∪ P c 1 ; the trusted party receives φ as the input from the constrained parties in P c 1 .
2. The trusted party evaluates g. Let P φ be the set of parties who send φ to the trusted party.
3. The adversary receives the outputs of the parties in P f 1 ; depending on the outputs it received, the adversary can (adaptively) choose to corrupt a new set of parties P f 2 and obtain their outputs; the adversary then chooses two sets of constrained parties P c 2 and P c 3 ; parties in P c 1 and P c 2 receive ⊥; other uncorrupted parties receive their outputs.
At the end, the fault-free parties and the constrained parties output what they receive from the trusted party; the ideal-world adversary generates an output.
Real world: In the real world, the parties execute a protocol Π to evaluate g. The real world adversary can turn a fault-free party into a constrained party or a corrupted party during the protocol execution.
At the end of the protocol execution, the fault-free parties and the constrained parties output their outputs from Π; the real-world adversary generates an output (which can depend on the information it gathers during the execution of Π).
As in the case of static adversary, we say Π is a secure multiparty computation protocol if for every real world adversary A, there exists an ideal world adversary I such that:
1. A and I choose the same three set of constrained parties and the same set of corrupted parties.
The following two distributions are indistinguishable:
Overview
In section 5, we construct a MPC protocol for n > 4e f + 3e c which uses broadcast (section 3) and VSS (section 4) as building blocks. We assume δ = 0 (i.e. a fault-free party can always successfully receive messages from other fault-free parties) in sections 3, 4 and 5. In section 6, we discuss how to extend our results to the case of δ < 1 6 . In section 7, we conclude and suggest some future directions.
Broadcast
Definitions
In broadcast, there is a distinguished sender p s with input v. We say a protocol achieves broadcast if the followings hold:
• Agreement: If an uncorrupted party outputs v ( =⊥) 5 , then all fault-free parties output v .
• Correctness: If the sender is uncorrupted and an uncorrupted party outputs v ( =⊥), then v = v or v = φ. If the sender is fault-free, then all fault-free parties output v.
If the sender is constrained, it is possible that all fault-free parties output φ. We assume a constrained sender will abort if it outputs φ in the broadcast protocol. We reduce the broadcast problem to the consensus problem. In consensus, every party p i has an input v i . Consensus is achieved if the followings hold:
• Agreement: All fault-free parties output a common value v. A constrained party either outputs v or ⊥(abort).
• Persistence: If all fault-free parties have the same input v , then v = v .
For the rest of the section, we focus on the case where the domain of values is restricted to {0,1}. It is easy to see that if we have a broadcast protocol for a single bit, then we can have broadcast protocol for a -bit string by running the bit-protocol -times sequentially.
Reducing broadcast to consensus
Under our communication model, broadcast cannot be achieved by simply having the sender sending its value to all parties and then running the consensus protocol. The problem is that the sender could be constrained and fault-free parties may not receive the value from the sender. Nevertheless, we show the following:
Lemma 1 Consensus implies broadcast.
Proof We construct a broadcast protocol from any consensus protocol: 
The consensus protocol is run twice in the construction. Roughly speaking, the first execution establishes a common value among the parties. However, if the sender is constrained, then the established value may be different from v. The second execution is to determine if the sender is "happy" with the established value. If the sender is not happy, then all parties output φ. The formal proof proceeds as follows: 
Consensus for
Following the principle of Berman et al. [5] , the construction of the consensus protocol is done through constructing protocols for weaker consensus variants: weak consensus, graded consensus, king consensus and then consensus. In all these (sub-)protocols, we only need to know the number of fault-free parties e f f def = n − e f − e c , but not e f and e c ; moreover, we only require authenticate (but not private) point-to-point channels. For all these (sub-)protocols, p i has an input bit and we denote it as b i .
Weak Consensus
We say weak consensus is achieved if the following two conditions hold:
• Persistence: If all fault-free parties have the same input bit b, then all fault-free parties output b.
• Agreement: If an uncorrupted party outputs b ∈ {0, 1}, then all uncorrupted parties output b or 2.
1. p i sends b i to all parties.
2. Let X 0 i and X 1 i be the number of 0 and 1 received by p i respectively.
Lemma 2 Protocol WConsensus achieves weak consensus for n > 3e f + 2e c .
Proof Persistence: Note that e f f > n 2 . Letb be the complement of a bit b. If all fault-free parties p i have the same input bit b, then X b i ≥ e f f and Xb i < e f f . Hence p i will output b. Agreement: Suppose there exists two uncorrupted parties p i and p j outputting 0 and 1 respectively. Then |X 0 i ∩ X 1 j | ≥ e f f − (e f + e c ) = n − e f − e c − (e f + e c ) > e f . Therefore, there exists more than e f parties sending different bits to p i and p j in round 1. This is a contradiction since there are at most e f corrupted parties.
Graded consensus
In graded consensus, every party p i outputs a bit along with a grade g i . Graded consensus is achieved if the following three conditions are satisfied:
• Persistence: If all fault-free parties have the same input bit b, then all fault-free parties output b with g = 1.
• Agreement: If an uncorrupted party outputs b with g = 1, then all fault-free parties output b, all constrained parties output b or ⊥.
• Completeness: No fault-free party outputs ⊥.
1. p i sends the output of WConsensus(p i , b i , e f f ) to all parties.
2. Let X 0 i , X 1 i and X 2 i be the number of 0, 1 and 2 received by p i respectively.
Lemma 3 Protocol GConsensus achieves graded consensus for n > 3e f + 2e c .
Proof Persistence: If all fault-free parties have the same input bit b, then following the persistence property of weak consensus, they output the same bit b in WConsensus. For a fault-free party p i , X b i ≥ e f f and Xb i < e f f . Therefore p i outputs b with g i = 1. Agreement: If an uncorrupted party p i outputs b with g i = 1, then X b i ≥ e f f . Hence at least e f f − e f uncorrupted parties have b as the output of WConsensus. Following the agreement property of weak consensus, the number of uncorrupted parties that outputb in WConsensus is equal to 0. By counting, the number of uncorrupted parties that output 2 in WConsensus is at most e f f + e c − (e f f − e f ) = e c + e f . Assume on contrary that there exists an uncorrupted party p j outputsb in GConsensus. Then Xb j ≥ X b j . Note that allb p j received in step 1 are from corrupted parties. Therefore, X 2 j ≤ e f + e c + (e f − Xb j ). (e f + e c corresponds to the number of 2 received due to uncorrupted parties; e f − Xb j corresponds to the number of 2 received due to corrupted parties.) But Xb j + X 2 j ≤ Xb j + e f + e c + (e f − Xb j ) = 2e f + e c < e f f as n > 3e f + 2e c and e f f = n − e f − e c . Therefore, max {X 0 j , X 1 j } + X 2 j < e f f and p j should output ⊥ instead. This leads to a contradiction. Completeness: By the agreement property of weak consensus, for some bit b, each fault-free party has either b or 2 as the output of WConsensus. Therefore, for a fault-free party p i , max{X 0 i , X 1 i } + X 2 i ≥ e f f . Hence no fault-free party outputs ⊥.
King Consensus
In king consensus, there is a designated party p k known as the king. King consensus is achieved if the followings hold:
• Persistence: If all fault-free parties have the same input bit b, then all uncorrupted parties that do not abort output b.
• Correctness: If the king p k is fault-free, then all uncorrupted parties that do not abort output the same bit.
2. p k sends v k to all parties. 
If (g i
= 1) and p i receives v k from p k and vk = φ, then p i sets v i = v k . 4. Let (v i , g i ) be the output of GConsensus(p i , v i , e f f ). p i outputs v i .
Consensus
We show how to construct a consensus protocol from a king consensus protocol:
2. for k = 1 to n − e f f + 1 do:
3. p i outputs b i .
Theorem 1 Protocol Consensus achieves consensus for n > 3e f + 2e c .
Proof Persistence: If all fault-free parties enter the protocol Consensus with the same input bit b, then by the persistence property of king consensus, all uncorrupted parties that do not abort output the same bit b. Agreement: Note that n−e f f +1 = e f +e c +1. There exists a fault-free party p i ∈ {p 1 , . . . , p e f +ec+1 }. By the correctness property of king consensus, all fault-free parties will have the same value for b after KConsensus p i is run. Agreement then follows from the persistence property of king consensus.
Consensus for
If the values of e f and e c are known a priori, then we can improve the bound in Theorem 1. On a high level, the construction takes two steps. First, based on the consensus protocol we have for n > 3e f + 2e c , we construct a weak broadcast (to be defined) protocol for n ≥ 3e f + 2e c . Second, we convert a weak broadcast protocol into a consensus protocol.
Weak Broadcast
In weak broadcast, there is a sender p s with an input bit b. Weak broadcast is achieved if the following two conditions hold:
• Agreement: All fault-free parties output a common bit b .
• Correctness: If the sender is fault-free, then b = b .
Note that in weak broadcast, we do not concern the outputs of constrained parties. In the following protocol, unless explicitly mentioned, if a party fails to receive a value from another party, then 2 is used as a default value. Protocol WBroadcast(p i , e f , e c ) 1. p s sends the bit b to all parties, outputs b and exits the protocol. All other parties will ignore messages sent by p s in the subsequent rounds. Lemma 5 WBroadcast achieves weak broadcast for n ≥ 3e f + 2e c , e f , e c ≥ 1.
Proof First, we give an informal explanation on how the protocol works. In round 3, parties attempt to check if the sender is corrupted. If a party p i receives b i ∈ {0, 1} from the sender but e f + 1 parties report that they receivedb i , then the sender is cheating. In this case, p i sets b i to 2 (this helps to reduce the number of contradicting inputs between fault-free parties). If the sender is not cheating, then all the remaining (≥ 2e f + e c − 1) fault-free parties will report values consistent with each other in rounds 3 and 4. A fault-free party p i will "lock" the output as b i (by setting g i = 1), regardless of what happens next. If the sender is not corrupted and all fault-free parties "lock" the output, then we are done. On the other hand, if no party locks the output, then the sender is either faulty or constrained. In round 9, the parties (excluding the sender) execute the consensus protocol given in Theorem 1. Now, we have one less faulty(or constrained) party, the sender. Consensus can be achieved since n − 1 > max{3(e c − 1) + 2e s , 3e c + 2(e s − 1)} and the fault-free parties will output a common value. The only problem is that some fault-free parties "lock" their outputs while some do not. What we show is that if this is the case, then all fault-free parties will enter the consensus protocol in step 9 with the same input bit. Therefore, agreement could still be achieved among the fault-free parties. We now proceed to the formal proof. Let R f f and R f be the set of fault-free parties (excluding the sender) and the set of corrupted parties (excluding the sender) respectively. Consider the following three cases:
• A fault-free sender: By inspection, all p i ∈ R f f have b i = b by the end of round 3. In addition, for any
It follows that all fault-free parties output b.
• A corrupted sender: Since the sender is a corrupted party, |R f | ≤ e f − 1 and n − 1 > 3(e f − 1) + 2e c , consensus can be achieved by the Consensus protocol in round 9 and all fault-free parties p i will have the same output σ i . If no fault-free party p i sets g i = 1 in round 5, then all fault-free parties output a common bit.
Before we consider the case that there exists a fault-free party that sets g = 1 in round 5, we show that if an uncorrupted party p i sends b i ∈ {0, 1} in round 5, then no uncorrupted party sendsb i in that round. Assume this is not true. Then there exists two uncorrupted parties p i ,p j such that p i sends 0 and p j sends 1 in round 5, i.e., |S i |, |S j | ≥ 2e f + e c − 1 (in round 4). Since the sender is corrupted and it does not take part in the protocol after round 1, there are at most e f − 1 corrupted parties in
An uncorrupted party will not send contradicting bits to different parties in round 3, so the two sets S i − R f and S j − R f are disjoint. Since there are at most e c constrained parties and e c ≥ 1, one of the two sets contains at least e f + 1 fault-free parties while the other set contains at least e f fault-free parties. Without loss of generality, assume S i − R f (and hence S i ) contains at least e f + 1 fault-free parties. Let p k be a fault-free party in S j . All fault-free parties in S i send 0 in round 3, as well as in round 2. p k , being a fault-free party, receives ≥ e f + 1 copies of 0 in round 2. Therefore b k = 1 by the end of round 3 which means p k does not send a '1' to p j in that round, and hence p k / ∈ S j . A contradiction.
For any two fault-free parties p j and p k , if b j = 2, then |Yb
So if a fault-free p j send b j in round 5, then p j ∈ Z b j k for any fault-free p k . Now, suppose a fault-free party p i sets g i = 1. Then the number of fault-free parties in |S i | is at least 2e f + e c − 1 − (e f − 1 + e c ) = e f . Hence there exists at least e f fault-free parties p j with
. Therefore, at least e f fault-free parties send b i in round 5. Hence |Z
We have already shown that no uncorrupted party sendb i in round 5, and since |R f | < e f , |Zb i k | < e f for a fault-free p k . Therefore a k = b i . And since the majority of parties are fault-free, a k = a k . All fault-free parties p k will enter the consensus protocol in step 9 with the same input a k = b i . Hence p k will output b i regardless of the value of g k .
• A constrained sender: Let b be the input of the sender. The sender is uncorrupted, so no uncorrupted party receivesb in round 1 nor sendsb in round 3. As in the case of a faulty sender, if no fault-free party p i sets g i = 1, then all fault-free parties will output a common bit.
Now suppose a fault-free party p i sets g i = 1. It is easy to see that b i = b. We are going to show that a k = b for all fault-free parties p k . g i = 1 implies |S i | ≥ 2e f + e c − 1. Since there could be at most e f corrupted parties and e c − 1 constrained parties in
Using the same argument as in the case of a faulty sender, we could show that
There are exactly e f corrupted parties, e c − 1 constrained parties and e f fault-free parties in S i . For all fault-free parties p k , |Z b k | ≥ e f . There could be some fault-free parties p k such that |Zb k | is equal to e f (as there are e f corrupted receivers) and they will set a k = 2. Nevertheless, we will show that there are at most e f such fault-free parties. Consider a corrupted party p f . There are e f corrupted parties in total and there are exactly e f corrupted parties in S i , so p f must be in S i . Since |Yb ,i f | ≤ e f , p f sendsb to at most e f fault-free parties p l in round 3. Only these p l will have p f in Zb l . Therefore, at most e f of such p l set a l = 2. Hence at least e f + e c fault-free parties p k set a k = b. On the other hand, a fault-free party will receive at most e f (from the corrupted parties) +e c − 1(from the constrained parties) 6 copies ofb in round 7. Therefore, all fault-free parties p k will set a k = b in round 8.
Combining two cases, all fault-free parties p k will have a k = b and hence they will output b.
From weak broadcast to consensus
Once we have a protocol for weak broadcast, it is easy to construct a consensus protocol:
1. Each party p i weak-broadcasts the input bit b i using the protocol WBroadcast. Theorem 2 There is a consensus protocol for n ≥ 3e f + 2e c , e f ≥ 1, e c ≥ 1, assuming the values of e f and e c are known a priori.
Verifiable secret sharing (VSS)
In verifiable secret sharing (VSS), there is a special party p d known as the dealer. The dealer holds a secret s. A VSS protocol consists of two phases: a sharing phase and a reconstruction phase. In the sharing phase, the dealer shares the secret with other parties. Parties may disqualify a non fault-free dealer. If the dealer is not disqualified, then in the reconstruction phase, the parties reconstruct a value based on their views in the sharing phase.
In our case, VSS protocol is used as a tool for multiparty computation. Our definition requires a VSS protocol to have the verifiable secret and polynomial sharing property [15] . In this section, we assume the values of e f and e c are known a priori. We say a protocol achieves verifiable secret sharing if the followings hold:
• Privacy: If the dealer is uncorrupted, then the view of the adversary during the sharing phase reveals no information on s.
• Agreement: If an uncorrupted party disqualifies the dealer, then all uncorrupted parties that do not abort disqualify the dealer.
• Commitment: If the dealer is not disqualified, then there exists a polynomial h (x) of degree e f such that at the end of the sharing phase, all fault-free parties p i (locally) output h (i); a constrained party p j which does not abort outputs h (j). All uncorrupted parties that do not abort output h (0) in the reconstruction phase.
• Correctness: No fault-free party will abort the protocol. A fault-free dealer will not be disqualified while a constrained dealer may be disqualified. But if an uncorrupted dealer is not disqualified, then h (0) = s.
Theorem 3
Assuming the values e f and e c are known a priori, there exists a VSS protocol for n ≥ 4e f + 3e c + 1.
Proof We construct a VSS protocol with the above resilience. The protocol is based on the bivariate solution of Feldman-Micali [13] . We start by giving a high level description of the protocol. In round 1, the dealer shares the secret via a random bivariate polynomial of degree e f + 1. If the dealer is constrained, then a fault-free party may not receive its entitled share. If this happens, a fault-free party cannot take a default value as it will not be on the polynomial and correctness will be violated. Instead, a party broadcasts "receive" in round 2 if it has received its entitled share. Let G be the group of parties who broadcast "receive". If |G| is too small, then the dealer is disqualified. Otherwise, the parties within G proceed to verify if the dealer has shared a valid secret, using a similar approach as in [13] (with suitable modifications to tolerate the presence of constrained parties). The parties that are not in G will not take part in the verification. After the verification, if the dealer is not disqualified, then all parties in G have shares correspond to a valid secret. The parties outside G then compute their shares by interpolating the shares from the parties in G (here we exploit the fact that the secret is shared using a bivariate polynomial). We assume the secret s is taken from some finite field F. In the following, if the dealer broadcasts a value and the parties receive φ as the output, then we implicitly assume that all parties disqualify the dealer. VSS-share(p d ) 1. The dealer chooses a random bivariate polynomial f of degree at most e f in each variable such that f (0, 0) = s. The dealer sends to party p i the polynomials g i (x) def = f (x, i) and
2. p i broadcasts "0" if it does not receive g i (x) and h i (x) from the dealer (or g i (x) and h i (x) are not polynomials of degree e f ), otherwise p i broadcasts "1". Let G be the group of parties which broadcast "1". If |G| < 3e f + 2e c + 1, then the dealer is disqualified. Otherwise, each party p i ∈ G does the following:
(a) For every party p j ∈ G, p i sends g i (j) and h i (j) to p j . Let g j,i and h j,i be the two values received by p i from p j ∈ G. p i aborts if it receives values from less than 2e f + e c + 1 parties.
(b) For every party p j ∈ G, if (g j,i = h i (j) and g j,i = φ) or (h j,i = g i (j) and h j,i = φ), then p i broadcasts "complaint : i,j" else p i broadcasts "no complaint: i,j". Note that if an uncorrupted p i broadcasts "complaint: i,j", then p j or the dealer is corrupted.
(c) The dealer broadcasts f j,k def = f (j, k) and f k,j def = f (k, j) if "complaint: j,k" is broadcasted by a party p j ∈ G.
(d) If there exists a j such that (i) f j,i and f i,j are revealed in last step and (ii) f j,i = g i (j) or f i,j = h i (j), then p i broadcasts "complaint", otherwise p i broadcasts "okay". (If an uncorrupted p i broadcasts "complaint", then the dealer must be corrupted. On the other hand, if the dealer is uncorrupted and p i broadcasts "complaint", then p i must be corrupted.) (e) If p i broadcasts "complaint" in last step, then the dealer broadcasts g i (x) and h i (x).
(f) p i broadcasts "reject" if one of the followings hold:
• p i broadcasts "complaint" in step 2(d)
• There exists a public polynomial g k (x) and
The dealer does not respond to the complaints broadcasted in step 2(b) or step 2(d); otherwise, p i broadcasts "accept".
3. If less than 3e f + 2e c + 1 parties in G broadcast "accept", then the dealer is disqualified.
Otherwise, note that two polynomials g i (x) and h i (x) are associated with each uncorrupted party p i in G (If the polynomials are not made public in step 2(e), then the polynomials associated with p i are the two polynomials p i received in step (1)). Each party p i ∈ G sends h i (j) to all parties p j / ∈ G.
4. For each party p i / ∈ G, p i constructs a degree e f polynomial g i (x) by using the Reed-Solomon error-correction interpolation procedure on the values it received in last step (If p i cannot construct such polynomial or p i receives less than 2e f + e c + 1 shares, then p i aborts). 2. Let SS i be the set of secret shares p i receives in last round. If |SS i | < 3e f + 1, then p i aborts else p i reconstructs a polynomial h 0 (x) of degree e f by using the Reed-Solomon errorcorrection interpolation on the set SS i and outputs h 0 (0).
We now proceed to prove that the above protocol achieves VSS.
• Privacy: Consider an uncorrupted dealer. If an uncorrupted party p i broadcasts "complaint: i,j" in step 2(b), then p j must be a corrupted party. It is easy to see that if a party p i broadcasts a complaint in step 2(d), then p i is a corrupted party. Therefore, all the information broadcast by an uncorrupted dealer on f , if any, is a subset of the shares the corrupted parties entitled to receive in step 1. Since the secret is shared by a random bivariate polynomial of degree e f , we conclude that the view of the adversary is independent of s during the sharing phase.
• Agreement: Note that the decision of disqualifying a dealer is completely dependent on the messages broadcasted by the parties. If an uncorrupted party does not abort by the end of the sharing phase, then by the agreement property of broadcast, the values it received from the broadcasts are same as those received by fault-free parties. Hence agreement follows.
• Correctness: We first consider a fault-free dealer. All fault-free parties will be in G. Since n ≥ 4e f + 3e c + 1, it follows that |G| ≥ 3e f + 2e c + 1. In addition, all fault-free parties broadcast "accept" in step 2(f). For a constrained party p i that is not in G, it is easy to see that g i (x) reconstructed in step 3 (if p i does not abort) is equal to f (x, i).
Next we consider a constrained dealer that is not disqualified. For an uncorrupted party p i ∈ G that does not abort by step 2(f), it is easy to see that g i (x) = f (x, i) and h i (x) = f (x, i). If the dealer is not disqualified, then ≥ 3e f + 2e c + 1 parties broadcasts "accept" in step 2(f). Let G be the set of fault-free parties among these ≥ 3e f + 2e c + 1 parties. |G | ≥ 2e f + e c + 1. It then follows that every fault-free party (or constrained party that does not abort in step 3) p i that is not in G can reconstruct g i (x) = f (x, i). An uncorrupted party p i (if it does not abort) will then output f (0, i) in step 4.
• Commitment: We consider the case of a non-disqualified corrupted dealer. If a corrupted dealer is not disqualified, then at least 2e f + e c + 1 fault-free parties broadcast "accept" in step 2(f). Let G be the set of such fault-free parties. Following [13, Lemma 2] , there exists a bivariate polynomial f of degree e f in each variable such that for all p i ∈ G , g i (x) = f (x, i) and h i (x) = f (i, x). Now consider an uncorrupted party p j ∈ G but not in G . There are 2 possible scenarios:
-p j broadcasts a complaint in step 2(d). g j (x) and h j (x) are made public in step 2(e). For all p i ∈ G , g j (i) = h i (j) and h j (i) = g i (j). Hence it follows that g j (x) = f (x, j) and h i (x) = f (x, i).
-p j does not broadcast a complaint in step 2(d). If p j does not abort in step 2(b), then h j (i) = f i (j) and f j (i) = h i (j) for at least 2e f + e c + 1 − (e f + e c ) = e f + 1 parties p i ∈ G . Since f is a bivariate polynomial of degree e f , it follows that h j (x) = f (j, x) and g j (x) = f (x, j). Therefore if p j does not broadcast a complaint in step 2(d), it will not broadcast "reject" in step 2(f).
We conclude that for all uncorrupted parties p i ∈ G that do not abort by step 2, h i (x) = f (i, x) and g i (x) = f (x, i). It is easy to see that if an uncorrupted party p j / ∈ G does not abort by step 3, p j can reconstruct g j (x) = f (x, j).
Hence it follows that an uncorrupted party p i (if it does not abort) outputs f (0, i) in step 4.
It also follows that all uncorrupted parties that do not abort output h (0) by the end of VSS-reconstruct.
MPC
We now construct a MPC protocol following the paradigm in [3] . On a high level, each party shares its private input, evaluates the circuit gate by gate, and then reconstructs the outputs.
Input Phase: Every party shares its private input using VSS-share. If a party is disqualified (when it plays the role of the dealer), then the party is added to the set D. Note that by the end of the input phase, all uncorrupted parties that do not abort have the same view on D.
Circuit Evaluation: All parties that do not abort evaluate the circuit g gate by gate. A party who was disqualified in the input phase does not take part in this phase and all other parties will ignore the messages sent from that party. It suffices to consider the addition and multiplication gates. Since our VSS protocol has the polynomial sharing property, addition and multiplication can be done using standard techniques (e.g., see [7, section 4 .52]) and we omit the details here.
Output phase: Reconstructing output is easy. For each output wire, each party sends its share to the party who is entitled to receive the output. The corresponding party then reconstructs the output from the shares it received using error correction. A party aborts if it receives less than 3e f + 1 entitled shares.
6 Extending to the case of δ < 1 6 We describe how to extend the results from the previous sections (which assume δ = 0) to the case of δ < 1 6 , at the expense of increasing the round complexity by a factor of 2. More precisely, we show how to compile a protocol Π for δ = 0 into a protocol Π for δ < 1 6 . Our broadcast protocol Π for δ = 0 assumes n ≥ 3e f + 2e c but does not assume secure channels. If p i is supposed to send p j a message m in Π, then the followings are carried out in Π :
• p i sends m to all parties who then forward the message to p j .
• If there exists m such that p j receives ≥ Consider the following two cases:
1. Both p i and p j are fault-free parties: since n ≥ 3e f + 2e c , at least (2e f + e c )(1 − δ) fault-free parties receive m from p i . The number of copies of m p j received is at least (2e f + e c )(1 − 2δ) which is greater than For VSS and MPC protocols, we assume n ≥ 4e f + 3e c + 1 but we also assume secure channels. If p i is supposed to send p j a message m in Π, then the following steps are carried out in Π :
• p i picks a random polynomial h(x) of degree e f such that h(0) = m. p i sends h(k) to p k who then forwards the share to p j .
• Based on the shares p j received, using the Reed-Solomon error-correction interpolation procedure, p j constructs a polynomial h (x) of degree e f such that at least 2e f + 1 shares are on h (x). If p j cannot construct such polynomial, then p j sets m = φ else m = h (0).
First we note that if p i is uncorrupted, then the view of the adversary is independent of m since h is a random polynomial of degree e f . Second, if both p i and p j are uncorrupted and p j does not set m = φ, then p j receives 2e f + 1 shares that are on h (x). e f + 1 of these shares are from uncorrupted parties. Hence h (x) = h(x) since both h (x) and h(x) are of degree e f + 1. Finally, if both p i and p j are fault-free parties, then p j will receive at least (3e f + 2e c + 1)(1 − 2δ) ≥ 2e f + 1 (assuming δ < 1 6 and e c ≥ 1) correct shares. On the other hand, p j will receive at most e f corrupted shares. Hence p j can always reconstruct h(x) using error-correction.
Conclusion and Open problems
In this paper, we consider a communication model where message delivery is neither always guaranteed nor always in the hands of the adversary. We has developed broadcast and VSS protocols under this model. However, we do not know if the bounds are tight. Another interesting direction is to consider what is achievable if the global clock is removed from the model.
